Secure Autonomous Systems

CSCI 6907/3907 86

Spring 2024

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https://bit.ly/secureauto-spring24

Autonomy

What makes something “**autonomous**”?

Aspects of Autonomy?

- Perception
- Compute
- Actuation
- Planning
- Sensing
- Motion

Autonomy | A Definition

Autonomy



Autonomy | A Definition

Autonomy is the **ability to perform given tasks** based on the **system's perception without human intervention**



Basic Definitions/ Concepts

- Cyber-Physical Systems
- Real-Time Systems
- Security/Safety/Resiliency





LARGE

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

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

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

SYSTEMS

LARGE

COMPLEX

MODELING, ANALYSIS, SECURITY ARE **HARD PROBLEMS**

INTERCONNECTED

SYSTEMS

CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

CYBER

```
                TS      TEMPR60         # FOR GENERALIZED RETURN TO OTHER BANKS.
P40A/P          TC      BANKCALL        # SUBROUTINE TO CHECK PGNCS CONTROL
                CADR    G+N,AUTO# AND AUTO STABILIZATION MODES
                CCS     A               # +0 INDICATES IN PGNCS, IN AUTO
                TCF     TURNITON        # + INDICATES NOT IN PGNCS AND/OR AUTO
                CAF     APSFLBIT        # ARE WE ON THE DESCENT STAGE?
                MASK    FLGWRD10
                CCS     A
                TCF     GOBACK          # RETURN
                CAF     BIT5            # YES, CHECK FOR AUTO-THROTTLE MODE
                EXTEND
                RAND    CHAN30
                EXTEND
                BZF     GOBACK          # IN AUTO-THROTTLE MODE -- RETURN
TURNITON        CAF     P40A/PMD        # DISPLAYS V50N25 R1=203 PLEASE PERFORM
                TC      BANKCALL        # CHECKLIST 203 TURN ON PGNCS ETC.
                CADR    GOPERF1
                TCF     GOTOP00H        # V34E TERMINATE
                TCF     P40A/P          # RECYCLE
GOBACK          CA      TEMPR60
                TC      BANKJUMP        # GOODBYE.  COME AGAIN SOON.
```

software, control algorithms, code

networking, communication

ECUs, microcontrollers, PLCs

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PHYSICAL

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sensors

actuators, motors



”plants”

CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

CYBER

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PHYSICAL

sensors

actuators, motors

”plants”


SENSING AND ACTUATION IS EVERYWHERE

SENSING/ACTUATION IN THE REAL WORLD



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

SENSING/ACTUATION IN THE REAL WORLD

- Periodic Sensing



SENSING/ACTUATION IN THE REAL WORLD

- Periodic Sensing
- Quick computation



SENSING/ACTUATION IN THE REAL WORLD

- Periodic sensing
- Quick computation
- In time actuation



PERIODIC SENSING

QUICK COMPUTATION

IN TIME ACTUATION


PERIODIC SENSING
QUICK COMPUTATION
IN TIME ACTUATION
TIME

REAL-TIME SYSTEMS

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ONE OF THE **FOUNDATIONAL** AREAS FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

REAL-TIME SYSTEMS

Consider an airbag deployment system

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

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

UNDERSTANDING TIMING BEHAVIOR IS CRITICAL!

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

UNDERSTANDING TIMING BEHAVIOR IS CRITICAL!

DEADLINES = SAFETY OF PHYSICAL SYSTEM

REAL-TIME SYSTEMS

Consider an airbag deployment system

WHY NOT RUN CODE REALLY FAST?

50 – 65 milliseconds!

UNDERSTANDING TIMING BEHAVIOR IS CRITICAL!

CPS Challenges

Limited Resources
- Computational power, energy, cost

Timing Requirement
- Safety, reliability, deadlines

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Limited Resources
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Timing Requirement
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Security/System Upgradability
- Schedulability, Verifiability

CPS SECURITY


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Specialized protocols & hardware
Not connected to the internet
CPS
SECURITY
[?]
Limited capabilities
Finite (often severely constrained) resources


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Implantable (and other) medical devices
Power grids & other utilities

Autonomous Cars | UAVs | Medical/surgical robots | IoT

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CPS SECURITY RESILIENCY

RESILIENCY?

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SOFTWARE ERRORS CAN RESULT IN PHYSICAL FAILURES

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SECURITY AND RESILIENCY

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ATTACKER INTENT

SECURITY AND RESILIENCY

ATTACKER INTENT ..... Cause systems to crash

SECURITY AND RESILIENCY

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NOT CONCERNED WITH DATA BEING STOLEN

SECURITY AND RESILIENCY

ATTACKER INTENT

Cause systems to crash

What if airbag deployment is delayed?

SECURITY AND RESILIENCY

ATTACKER INTENT ..... Cause systems to crash



Next Lecture

- **Design** of Autonomous Systems
- **Sensing**
  - IMU, GPS, Radar, LIDAR, Camera, etc.