Automated Cross-Platform Reverse Engineering of CAN Bus Commands From Mobile Apps

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> **Presented by: Yuan Gao** 10/18/2022

Acknowledgments: Some slide material derived from authors.




ntroduction

In-vehicle Network and CAN Bus



S		R	Ι	D			I	Data Fi	eld				С	Α	E
0	Identifier	Т	D		Byte	Byte	Byte	Byte	Byte	Byte	Byte	Byte	R	C	0
F		R	Ε	С	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	С	K	F





Control Area Network (CAN) bus.

CAN bus command.



Applications of CAN Bus Commands

Driver Behavior Monitoring



An On Board Diagnostic (OBD-II) dongle, used by insurance company Progressive to monitor driver behavior

Vehicle Control



An In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) system.




Applications of CAN Bus Commands - recently on Autonomous Driving







THE AUTOWARE FOUNDATION




Applications of CAN Bus Commands - Security

Vehicle Hacking



The Jeep Cherokee hacking

Vehicle Security Monitoring



CAN Bus Firewall


Reverse Engineering of CAN Bus Commands

State-of-the-art

- Fuzzing with random CAN bus commands
- Manually triggering physical actions and observing the CAN bus
- Shortcoming
 - Limited scalability: CAN bus commands are highly customized and diversified
 - **Excessive cost:** Significant manual effort and real automobiles are required




Observation








IVI App





OBD-II Dongle App



Contributions

- Effective Techniques: Authors design a suite of effective techniques to (meaning and functionality).
- recovered with semantics.

 Novel Approach: Authors propose a cost-effective and automatic approach for reverse engineering CAN bus commands through analyzing mobile apps.

uncover CAN bus command syntactics (structure and format) and semantics

Implementation and Evaluation: Authors implemented CANHunter on both Android and iOS platforms, and evaluated it with 236 car mobile apps. It discovered 182619 unique CAN bus commands in which 86.1% of them are




CANHunter

Chalenges and Insights

- Challenges
 - Precisely identify CAN bus command execution path
 - Command syntactics recovery
 - Command semantics recovery
- Solutions
 - Identify execution path with **backward program slicing**
 - Syntactics recovery with dynamic forced execution

- Semantics recovery with UI correlation and function argument association

Overview of CANHunter





Backward Slicing

Screen Info Diag.viewDidLoad()

- 13 v4 = UIButton()
- 14 v4.setText("Engine Controls")
- •••
- 27 v4.addTarget(v4,"initECUs")
 - // register button trigger function

MD_AllECUsToyota.initECUs()
4 v12.initWithRequestId("0x7E0","Engine Controls")
5 v12.frageID = "0x7E0"
...
13 v22 = BaseFahrzeug.initWithName("Corolla VIII")
14 v22.ECU = v12
...
25 v25 = v24.createWorkableECUKategorie(v22)

WorkableModell.createWorkableECUKategorie(a3)
12 v6 = a3
13 v7 = v6.ECU.frageID
18 v8 = v7.substring(2,5)
19 v9 = NSString.stringWithForamt("%@ 30 00 02",v8)
11
42 v5.writeValue(v9,v14,1) // Target API





Syntactics Recovery

Screen_Info_Diag.viewDidLoa

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13 v7 = v6.ECU.frageID // "0x7E0"
...
18 v8 = v7.substring(2,5) // "7E0"
19 v9 = NSString.stringWithForamt("%@
// "7E0 30 00 02" Command Syntactic
...
42 v5.writeValue(v9,v14,1) // Target A
```

ad()	< Introduction Diagnostic Carly>
	List of possibly built-in ECUs
n	2. Motor Control
s ()	Engine
jine Controls")	Engine Controls
Corolla VIII")	2. ABS / DSC / Brake
ie(v22)	ABS Brakes
	Steering Assist >
ategorie(a3)	3. Airbag
	Airbag
2 30 00 02″,v8)	Gurtstraffer
API	Show Adapter To Full-Version



Semantics Recovery

Screen_Info_Diag.viewDidLoad()

```
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```

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```
•••
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Carly Introduction Diagnostic List of possibly built-in ECUs 8 **1. Motor Control** Engine **Engine Controls** 2. ABS / DSC / Brake **ABS Brakes** Steering Assist 3. Airbag Airbag Gurtstraffer ------Show Adapter **To Full-Version**



Evaluation

Result Characteristics - App Categories

- Crawled 236 vehicle apps in April 2019
- 182619 CAN bus commands are discovered
- 107 apps expose direct CAN bus commands
- 109 apps expose indirect commands
- 20 apps are obfuscated

	# Total	# Dongle	# IVI
Android	122	74	48
iOS	114	72	42
Total (Android ∪ iOS)	236	146	90
Overlapped apps (Android ∩ iOS)	79	38	41

Table: Distribution of collected apps



Result Characteristics - App Categories

- Indirect (i.e., Interpreted) CAN Commands
 - IVI apps usually use interpreted commands for vehicle control
 - Interpreted commands are usually strings or numbers

Арр	Content	Sent to Cloud	Sent to Vehicle
AcuraLink	HORN_LIGHT, UNLOCK, LOCATION	\checkmark	
Alpine	frontSpeakerPattern, rearSpeakerPattern		\checkmark
Alpine Tunelt	RESUME, PHONE_DIAL_END, AUDIO_FOCUS	\checkmark	
Audi MMI Connect	LOCK, UNLOCK, G_STAT, FIND_CAR	\checkmark	
Carbin Control	Climate_Control_Temperature, Control_Fan_Speed		\checkmark
Car-Net	Unlock:2, Lock:3, Flash:0, Hornlight:1		\checkmark



Table: Interpreted commands from IVI apps.



Result Characteristics - Car Models

Car Maker	# Commands	Car	
Audi	51,517	A3,	
Volkswagon	44,504	Cab	
Skoda	11,009	Citi	
Toyota	9,030	Aur	
BMW	8,963	Seri	
Seat	8,277	lbiza	
Mercedes	7,247	Ben	
Lexus	6,087	CT2	

identify CAN bus commands from over 360 car models across 21 car makers

Model

A4, A5, A6, A7, A8, Q3, Q5, Q7, S3, S4 prio, Corrado, Caddy, Gol, Golf, Jetta, igo, Fabia, Rapid, Superb, Yeti is, Avensis, Camry, Corolla, Prius, RAV4 ies 1, 3, 5, M5, X5 a, Leon, Altea, Mii, Toledo, Arosa

١Z

200, ES350, GS350, GX460, RX450, IS460



Result Characteristics - Semantics

- 157296 (86.1%) CAN bus commands are recovered with semantics \bullet
- The semantics can be categorized into diagnosis and vehicle control

Semantics

Engine speed

Coolant temperature

Throttle angle

Oil temperature

Single door lock remote Blink on unlock key Sound on remote lock volume Auto unlock when moving



# Commands	Category
460	Diagnosis
281	Diagnosis
256	Diagnosis
176	Diagnosis
60	Control
42	Control
40	Control
27	Control

Table: Distribution of CAN bus commands over part of semantics

- Over 70% of the command syntactics and semantics are validated
- They tried the following three sources for validation:
 - Public resource
 - Cross validation
 - Real car testing

ics and semantics are validated es for validation:

Car Model	Syntac.	Semantics (Ground Truth)	Semantics (Our Result)	Matched
	0x727	Transmission	Transmission	\checkmark
Toyota	Ox7A1	Steering Assist	Steering Assist	\checkmark
Prius	0x7A2	Park Assist	APGS	\checkmark
	0x7E0	Engine Controls	ECT	✓ /
	0x70C	SteeringWheel	Steering wheel	\checkmark
Audi A3	0x714	DashBoard	Instrument	✓ /
	Ox7E1	TCMDQ	Transmission	\checkmark
Seat	0x713	Brake1ESP	ABS Brakes	\checkmark
lbiza	0x714	KombiUDS	Instruments	\checkmark
	0x158	Speed	EAT_TRANS_SPEED	\checkmark
Honda	0x17C	Engine RPM	ENG_STATUS	\checkmark
Civic	Ox1A4	VSA_STATUS	VSA_WARN_STATUS_ABS	\checkmark
	0x324	Water Tempreature	ENG_TEMP	X
	0x305	SEATBELT_STATUS	SRS_EDR_DELTA_VMAX	X
	0x35E	CAMERA_MESSAGES	FCM_WARN_STATUS	X

Table: Part of the commands validated with **public resources**.

Ann	And	roid	iOS		Overlapped	
Арр	<mark>#</mark> Syn.	# Sem.	<mark>∦ Syn</mark> .	# Sem.	∦ Syn.	# Sem.
BlueDriver	304	304	304	304	304	304
Carista	105,198	105,198	105,198	105,198	105,198	105,198
Carly for BMW	14,377	14,377	16,427	16,427	13,480	13,480
Carly for Mercedes	7,921	6,528	1,698	1,698	1,393	1,393
Carly for Toyota	5,305	5,266	39	39	39	39
Carly for VAG	16,402	7,283	18,627	10,429	7,283	7,283
CarVantage	41	41	41	41	41	41
Engie	144	144	68	68	68	68
inCarDoc	160	160	160	160	160	160
Kiwi OBD	220	220	6	6	6	6

Table: Part of the cross-platform validation (commands across different platforms) results.



Command	(RAV4)	Command (Cor	olla)	Semantics
750	14 1A 26	750 1A 6	65 02	Wireless door locking
750	14 92 26	750 92 6	65 02	Blink turn signals
750	14 9A 06	750 9A 4	45 02	Panic Function on remote
750	14 9A 25	750 9A 6	61 02	Relock automatically
750	14 9A 26	750 8A 6	65 02	Beep when locking
750	11 00 60	750 14 (06 00	Unlock via physical key
750	11 80 20	750 11 (CO 20	Unlock when shifting into gear
7C0	3B A2 40	7C0 3B /	A2 40	Display unit (MPG)
7C0	3B 74 A0	7C0 3B /	A7 C0	Seat belt warning (driver)
7CC	00 01 00	7CC 3B 8	32 00	Fan Speed

Table: Part of commands validated with real-car testing.

References

- <u>Paper</u>
- <u>GitHub repo</u>
- Presentation



Discussions

- Any idea on how we can prevent reverse engineering?
 - From app
 - From CAN bus
- Should we ask companies to standardize the CAN bus commands?