



Secure Autonomous Systems

CSCI 6907/3907 88

Fall 2022

Prof. Sibin Mohan

<https://bit.ly/secureauto-fall22>

Definitions

Autonomy

Cyber-Physical Systems

Real-Time Systems

Autonomy




Aspects of Autonomy?

- Perception
- Compute
- Actuation
- Planning
- Sensing
- Motion

Autonomy | A Definition

Autonomy is the **ability to perform given tasks** based on the **system's perception** **without** human intervention



Detour | This Course

Secure Autonomous Systems (CPS)

CSCI 6907_88 / CSCI 3907_88

Instructor: **Prof. Sibin Mohan** [Sibin/Prof. Sibin/Prof. Mohan]

Days/Times: TUE/THUR **12:45 PM – 2:00 PM**

Location: **SMITH 115**

Contact: **Blackboard**

Office Hours: **TUE/THUR 2:00 – 3:00 PM [SEH 5830]**

TA

- **Mohammad Samad** [he goes by “Sam”]
- Email: sam.ulhaque@gwu.edu
- Office Hours: TBA

Note: contact via **Blackboard** first

Course Content

- *design* of autonomous, cyber-physical and real-time systems
- *sensing*, IMU, GPS, Radar, LIDAR, Camera, etc.
- *localization*, Simultaneous localization And Mapping (SLAM)
- Extended Kalman Filter (EKF)
- *attacks* and *defenses* related to these topics
- *privacy and ethical issues* in the design and deployment of autonomous systems

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Security

<https://bit.ly/secureauto-fall22>

Course Content | MPs

- Hands-on exercises [4]
- open-source simulation and control platforms
 - Gazebo
 - VEINS
- One of the MPs will have a leaderboard-style competition!
- Final MP will involve programming/attacking an actual **hardware rover**



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Course Content | Paper Reading+Presentation

- Exploring state-of-the-art research in the area
- Learn how to **read** and **critique** relevant papers
- Present papers in class
 - Each student presents **three papers** over the course of the term

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Grading Criteria

In-class participation	5%
MP1 [V2X/VEINS]	10%
MP2 [UAV Security/Gazebo]	10%
MP3 [V2X Attack/Leaderboard/VEINS]	20%
MP4 [Hardware Rover]	25%
Paper Reading/Critique	30%

Grades

Conversion from numerical to letter grades

6907

95 – 100	= A
90 – 94	= A-
87 – 89	= B+
83 – 86	= B
80 – 82	= B-
77 – 79	= C+
73 – 76	= C
70 – 72	= C-
67 – 69	= D+
60 – 66	= D
50 – 59	= D-
< 50	= F

3907


90 – 100	= A
86 – 90	= A-
82 – 84	= B+
78 – 81	= B
75 – 77	= B-
72 – 74	= C+
68 – 71	= C
65 – 67	= C-
62 – 64	= D+
55 – 61	= D
45 – 54	= D-
< 45	= F


End of Detour

- Back to definitions/concepts
 - Cyber-Physical Systems
 - Real-Time Systems
 - Security/Safety/Resiliency











LARGE


LARGE



LARGE



LARGE



SYSTEMS

LARGE

COMPLEX

MODELING, ANALYSIS, SECURITY ARE **HARD PROBLEMS**

INTERCONNECTED

SYSTEMS

CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS


CYBER

```
005 P40A/P TC TEMPR60 # HELLO THERE...
006 P40A/P TC BANKCALL # FOR GENERALIZED RETURN TO OTHER BANKS.
007 CADR G+N,AUTO# AND AUTO STABILIZATION MODES
008 CCS A # +0 INDICATES IN PGNC'S, IN AUTO
009 TCF TURNITON # + INDICATES NOT IN PGNC'S AND/OR AUTO
010 CAF APSFLBIT # ARE WE ON THE DESCENT STAGE?
011 HASK FLOWRD10
012 CCS A
013 TCF GOBACK # RETURN
014 CAF BITS # YES, CHECK FOR AUTO-THROTTLE MODE
015 EXTEND
016 RAND CHAN30
017 EXTEND
018 BZF GOBACK # IN AUTO-THROTTLE MODE -- RETURN
019 CAF P40A/PPD # DISPLAYS V50N25 R1=203 PLEASE PERFORM
020 TC BANKCALL # CHECKLIST 203 TURN ON PGNC'S ETC..
021 CADR GOPERF1
022 TCF GOTOP00H # V34E TERMINATE
023 TCF P40A/P # RECYCLE
024 GOBACK CA TEMPR60
TC BANKCALL # GOODBYE - COME AGAIN SOON
```

software, control algorithms, code



networking, communication



ECUs, microcontrollers, PLCs

CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS


CYBER

```
005 P40A/P TS TEMPR60 # FOR GENERALIZED RETURN TO OTHER BANKS.
006 TC BANKCALL # SUBROUTINE TO CHECK PGNC'S CONTROL
007 CADR G+N,AUTO# AND AUTO STABILIZATION MODES
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021 CADR GOPERF1
022 TCF GOTOPO0H # V34E TERMINATE
023 TCF P40A/P # RECYCLE
024 GOBACK CA TEMPR60
025 TC BANKCALL # CONTINUE CONT ASSETS CONT
```

software, control algorithms, code



networking, communication



ECUs, microcontrollers, PLCs

PHYSICAL



sensors



actuators, motors




"plants"

CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS


CYBER

```
06 P4BA/P TS TEMPROG # FOR GENERALIZED RETURN TO OTHER BANKS
07 TC BANKCALL # SUBROUTINE TO CHECK PONGS CONTROL
08 CADR G4R,AUTOH AND AUTO STABILIZATION MODES
09 CCS A # *B INDICATES IN PONGS, IN AUTO
10 TCF TURNITON # * INDICATES NOT IN PONGS AND/OR AUTO
11 CAF APSFLRBT # ARE WE ON THE DESCENT STAGE?
12 HASK FLOWRDSB
13 CCS A
14 TCF GDBACK # RETURN
15 CAF BITS # YES, CHECK FOR AUTO-THROTTLE MODE
16 EXTEND
17 RAND CHAN30
18 EXTEND
19 RZF GDBACK # IN AUTO-THROTTLE MODE -- RETURN
20 CAF P4BA/PMD # DISPLAYS VSRN25 R1+203 PLEASE PERFORM
21 TC BANKCALL # CHECKLIST 203 TURN ON PONGS ETC.
22 CADR GDBPERF1
23 TCF GDTOPR0H # V34E TERMINATE
24 TCF P4BA/P # RECYCLE
25 GDBACK CA TEMPROG
```

software, control algorithms, code



networking, communication



ECUs, microcontrollers, PLCs

PHYSICAL



sensors




actuators, motors




"plants"

SENSING AND ACTUATION IS EVERYWHERE

SENSING/ACTUATION IN THE REAL WORLD




SENSING/ACTUATION IN THE REAL WORLD




SENSING/ACTUATION IN THE REAL WORLD

- Periodic Sensing



SENSING/ACTUATION IN THE REAL WORLD

- Periodic Sensing
- Quick computation



SENSING/ACTUATION IN THE REAL WORLD

- Periodic sensing
- Quick computation
- In time actuation



BRAKING



PERIODIC SENSING

QUICK COMPUTATION

IN TIME ACTUATION



REAL-TIME SYSTEMS

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“A system that requires both, **logical** as well as **temporal** correctness.”

REAL-TIME SYSTEMS

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- **Temporal correctness defined as a constraint: deadline**

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- **Deadlines determine usefulness of results**
 - **Deadline passes → usefulness drops**

REAL-TIME SYSTEMS

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- **Use well-defined scheduling algorithms [e.g., RM, EDF]**

ONE OF THE FOUNDATIONAL AREAS FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

REAL-TIME SYSTEMS

Consider an airbag deployment system



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
REAL-TIME SYSTEMS

Consider an airbag deployment system




REAL-TIME SYSTEMS

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
REAL-TIME SYSTEMS

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REAL-TIME SYSTEMS

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WHY NOT RUN CODE REALLY FAST?

UNDERSTANDING
TIMING BEHAVIOR
IS CRITICAL!



50 – 65 milliseconds!

The diagram shows a top-down view of a car's interior. On the left, a sensor (represented by a triangle) is connected to the ECU (Electronic Control Unit) in the center. An arrow points from the sensor to the ECU, and another arrow points from the ECU to the airbag. A double-headed arrow at the bottom indicates a timing window of 50 to 65 milliseconds between the sensor and the airbag.

CPS Challenges



Limited Resources

- Computational power, energy, cost



Timing Requirement

- Safety, reliability, deadlines

CPS Challenges



Limited Resources

- Computational power, energy, cost



Timing Requirement

- Safety, reliability, deadlines



Security/System Upgradability

- Schedulability, Verifiability

CPS

SECURITY

Physically isolated

Specialized protocols & hardware

Not connected to the internet


CPS

SECURITY

[?]

Limited capabilities

Finite (often severely constrained) resources



Autonomous Cars


UAVs

Medical/surgical robots

IoT

Delivery robots

Smart Manufacturing Systems



Autonomous Cars

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Medical/surgical robots

IoT

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Smart Manufacturing Systems

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CPS

SECURITY

RESILIENCY

Industrial Control Systems [Stuxnet!]

Automotive systems

Avionics systems

Implantable (and other) medical devices

Power grids & other utilities

RESILIENCY?

RESILIENCY?

SOFTWARE ERRORS CAN RESULT IN PHYSICAL FAILURES

RESILIENCY?

SOFTWARE ERRORS CAN RESULT IN PHYSICAL FAILURES



SECURITY AND RESILIENCY

SECURITY AND RESILIENCY

ATTACKER INTENT

SECURITY AND RESILIENCY

ATTACKER INTENT

Cause systems to crash

SECURITY AND RESILIENCY

ATTACKER INTENT

Cause systems to crash

NOT CONCERNED WITH DATA BEING STOLEN

SECURITY AND RESILIENCY

ATTACKER INTENT


Cause systems to crash

What if airbag deployment is delayed?

SECURITY AND RESILIENCY

ATTACKER INTENT

Cause systems to crash





Next Lecture

- **Design** of Autonomous Systems
- **Sensing**
 - IMU, GPS, Radar, LIDAR, Camera, etc.